In a sport defined by aesthetics and skills that are metricised through the lens of art rather than science, the players that stand the test of time and memory are often those who prioritised goalscoring and its related processes — chance creation, dribbling, ball-striking.
However, with football moving towards more and more structured play, a new ‘meta’ has become prevalent — the all-conquering defensive midfielder. Defensive midfielders have always been perhaps the most important players in any team, anchoring the team’s play both on and off the ball but in recent years with team structures becoming increasingly complex and comprehensive, the appreciation of these players has become far more accessible to even the casual viewer, and the technical and recruitment departments of the top teams in the world have also realised the importance of these players, electing to spend some very expensive packages to tie such players down on contracts.
This quickly inflating market has also come at a time where not only is general play becoming more structured, but there is a common system at the top level that requires an expansive skillset and extremely high potential from its deepest midfielder, a ceiling that is maybe approachable by any half-decent prospect, but the wide array of base fundamentals is rather rare to come by, further exaggerating the inflation on players that fit this profile.
What even is this profile? Is it really so valuable that so many teams are readying massive sums of cash to sign these players? Are there alternatives?
If I’d known you sold on, maybe: The genesis of contemporary midfields
I’d have let you waste another guy.
The last few years have seen a massive change in how teams tackle build-up in the first phase of play, and a big part of it has been the re-imagining of how midfields are structured. The usual structure of a midfield a couple years ago would have been the presence of a purely defensive-minded player, a player capable of playing box-to-box and an offensive-minded player — a 6, 8 and 10, if you will. However, around the end of 2022, a wind of change began to blow with Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City leading the charge. However, Guardiola’s new midfield system resulted in a response system by coaches looking to plan specifically against the setup he had now popularised, leaving us with two primary systems.
The first system is a central overload, stuffing the middle of the pitch with players to present a numerical advantage in almost any situation. This was accomplished by Pep having a player from the defensive line join the midfield with two midfielders pushing up while the third midfielder would hang back. The second system prioritises maximising zones of control rather than overloading one side, trying to pull apart teams by stretching them to their breaking point rather than utilising numerical advantages in smaller areas of the pitch one area at a time. It most commonly has a double pivot of midfielders that are generally reserved with their attacking intents, with the wide defenders pushing up into midfield and offering themselves as the primary connecting options to link the final third pieces to the larger build-up puzzle.
Guardiola’s central overload system was quickly picked up by other teams as an effective way to counter the previously (and still) prevalent 4-2-3-1, as often these teams relied on triangles and three-man movements to progress and defend. It is rather poetic that the most innovative build-up evolution of the last decade of football is based on the principle of ‘four is greater than three’, as the system’s primary edge over the 4-2-3-1 was its midfield ‘box’ of four players that could quite literally run rings around three-man structures due to their numerical advantage. However, football is not only played in pre-existing structures, rather the best moments in football come when the structures are disrupted or in transition, not at rest. It quickly became clear that the deep midfielder in this system needed to be nothing short of perfect, as any mistake would result in disaster for the team. The defensive midfielder needed to be more than adept in moments of transition, not only being able to orchestrate structures but being able to make the correct decisions in the middle of complete chaos, with the ability to execute those decision effectively.
Some teams decided to do away with the midfield ‘box’ but continued to play a similar structure, with one deep midfielder and two advanced midfielders. This increased the burden on the deep midfielder, as they now had to organise the backline and build-up, while also being the primary source of central progression as they were now no longer part of a double pivot. This was mostly done because the midfield box contained structural weaknesses in transition that were simply too risky to take if the team didn’t possess a pivot of the calibre of John Stones and Rodri. It came at lower defensive risk, yes, but also made ball progression through central areas far more difficult without the right player, resulting in teams going out on the hunt for the ‘perfect profile’. These players were seen not only as good players in their own right, but rather ceiling-raisers — individuals that can unlock an entire team’s potential by providing the right circumstances for others to shine — further skyrocketing their price.
I will meet you in hell, amethyst realm: The personnel that offer the solution
Can’t compete with the supernatural.
Who exactly are these special players, and what qualities do they have to possess? To explore this, let’s look at two examples of transfers that are currently in their respective processes this summer. Namely, the confirmed transfer of João Palhinha to Bayern Munich and the rumoured transfer of Manuel Ugarte to Manchester United.
Bayern Munich have struggled with holding a defensive shape when hit at pace on the counter, as well as progressing the ball through the centre due to the absence of a midfielder of the required profile while employing two advanced midfielders in Leon Goretzka and whoever is playing No.10 that week. Palhinha has been picked out by Bayern due to his great ability to progress the ball from central areas and become an anchor for the team in the early stages of build-up, but Bayern already have a midfielder with a better passing profile than Palhinha in Joshua Kimmich. The true reason Palhinha is worth €50m to Bayern despite being 29 is that he is physically very gifted, possessing the ability to cover massive amounts of ground to defend different areas, he is defensively elite, possessing top-level defensive technique in the tackle and interception departments as well as having the positional sense to know when to maintain structure and when to break it, a fatal flaw in Kimmich’s out-of-possession play: the man simply cannot sit still or wait. Palhinha possesses the physical and defensive profile to effectively play as a single pivot and let his midfield partners get into advanced areas without the worry of being burned on the break if the ball turns over.
A primary problem of Manchester United’s play last season was the gap between their defensive and midfield lines. United’s defensive line often sat deep due to their defensive personnel not possessing the speed to keep up with fast attacks should they push up and be hit on the counter, and their midfield line often advanced up the field to aid the counter-press and because United did not possess the tactical nuance in the final third to make inroads without serious numerical advantages. This resulted in a big open area in front of the defense when the ball was won by the opposition, a gap left by the lack of a proper defensive midfielder capable of progressing the ball into dangerous areas without having to advance up the field. Manuel Ugarte at Paris Saint-Germain has proven to be exactly what United needs, as he possesses a great passing range with the ability to create plays from deep, but this is without sacrificing defensive solidity as he is far more defensively astute than United’s previous deep midfielders both positionally, physically and technically. Ugarte at PSG was often forced to sit deep and spray passes past midfield lines as under Luis Enrique, the defense simply does not make progressive passes, rather electing to ping it long the second a short pass doesn’t present itself and rely on the front three’s great speed.
These two premium transfers are part of a movement in the current market to sign midfielders with high-level physical and technical profiles. Bruno Guimarães fits this profile too as well as of course Rodri who has perhaps become the best player in the world in the last couple of years, and Amadou Onana is another high-profile signing of this summer that fits the bill, joining Aston Villa after Douglas Luiz was sold to Juventus, and at a slightly lower level there are players like Aleix García and Yves Bissouma who have fulfilled similar roles at Girona and Tottenham Hotspur respectively, with García moving to Bayer Leverkusen who employ a similar structure to the counter-system developed in response to the midfield box. However, with a limited number of players to go around, clubs must be looking for alternative methods to give their teams these options in their structure, right? Why, of course.
Speed it up, slow it down: The alternative solutions
Need control, need it now, I need to live a thousand times, I cannot stop, I cannot cry.
In the search for alternatives to the currently prevalent midfield system, there have primarily been two schools of thought: the rotation of roles in midfield setups to accommodate for incongruent profiles and the introduction of defenders into later stages of build-up — yes, we are doing wildcards AGAIN. I’ve been on about this for nearly two years now, and I will not let it go.
Real Madrid have adapted their midfield setup to make up for the fact that they are missing this profile with Toni Kroos taking a passive deeper role in build-up, often dropping into the defensive line and allowing the full-backs to both push up the field, with his midfield partners (Eduardo Camavinga, Aurélien Tchouaméni and Federico Valverde) being the ones to cover large expanses of the field and recover the ball if its lost in central areas. This combined with Real’s general tendency to play a high line has compacted play into smaller areas of the pitch where a singular pivot in front of the defense who can patrol the entire area between the lines is unneeded, instead replaced by centre-backs who are unafraid to step up to close the gap and midfielders with the ability to close the gap from ahead. Valverde in particular has been crucial to this, as his almost supernatural athleticism has lended itself extremely well to a partnership with the less mobile but more technically adept Kroos, and Kroos’ retirement now leaves a massive question mark in how the Real midfield and defense will set up in his absence.
On the other hand, in Italy, several teams have been observed utilising a different method to make these spaces more usable. The most notable case of this is the sudden emergence of Riccardo Calafiori at Bologna and in the Italian national team, who naturally inverts into the centre of the pitch to offer himself as an option in build-up through the centre, often when the team are transitioning from one phase of play to the next which is a period of time in which a lot of chaos occurs as both teams shift into the shapes they are accustomed to: the perfect time for a player from deep to suddenly enter the centre of the pitch and create a numerical advantage, much like Oleksandr Zinchenko at Arsenal. In fact, this is precisely why Arsenal wanted Calafiori, as he possesses great technical skill and intelligence while not sacrificing on physical presence and defensive acumen, something Zinchenko lacked. This phenomenon of inverted full-backs is one that has been used before, by Guardiola himself when he was first experimenting with the midfield box, but it is rather vulnerable to being exposed in transition when opposition teams hit the defense at pace. However, Mikel Arteta has accumulated an embarrassment of physical riches, with the entire Arsenal team — especially the ones involved in the first and second phases of play — being towers with the strength and speed to match. While Manchester City had the height and strength to facilitate such play, their first-phase players were often not the fastest, resulting in bad game states when hit on the break, but it’s something Arsenal do not need to fret about as their players are quick enough to cover ground in time to stop such counter-attacks. In the most literal sense, Arsenal replaced the need for one specifically gifted player in the technical, defensive and physical departments by having a whole unit of them.
I had big ideas, the band were so excited: How it all matters
The kind you’d rather not share over the phone.
The tactical details are interesting, but what does it actually mean for certain players? Well, simply put, it is the death of the box-to-box midfielder.
The one thing all these new systems have in common is that none of them have a singular true box-to-box player who actively affects play in all three phases. Yes, they may occasionally show up late into the box or make a pass into the final third, but it is not a core part of their role. Players like Leon Goretzka, Joshua Kimmich and N’Golo Kanté must adapt to new roles where they are not the centre of play in all three phases but rather compartmentalised to smaller areas of the pitch, as the team simply needs to remain in structure rather than playing around a singular player. There are certain exceptions, like Arsenal technically having players involved in all three phases of play, but in reality this is due to the fact that Arsenal’s players often switch roles mid-game, so the role of the position remains the same but the personnel changes.
Note that of the names mentioned that will be affected, two are Bayern players. It is imperative that these two players figure out what they want to do with the changing tides in the sport lest they be relegated to the bench or a smaller team that is willing to accomodate their ways. The modern defensive midfielder is here, he is powerful, and he is impossible to avoid.
Looking for more thoughts and analysis of what is going on with Bayern munich during this offseason, plus a breakdown of the front office’s oddball transfer strategy and roster management? What about some ideas on what Bayern Munich could be cooking up with Jamal Musiala and Florian Wirtz? Good, then we have you covered with our Bavarian Podcast Works — Weekend Warm-up Show. You can get the podcast on Spotify, Patreon, or below: