Nothing says ‘Leeds United chasing a game late on’ like the structural changes made by Daniel Farke whenever his team are doing just that.
It is not a secret the German manager is blessed with an ample supply of attacking footballers, but nights like Tuesday — when Leeds fell short of getting it together away against Sunderland — really highlighted the number he has at his disposal.
His fabled front four turned into something resembling a front six. Farke’s 4-2-3-1, or thereabouts, became a mash-up of three strikers and three wingers. The kitchen sink in full flight. But to no avail.
As time goes on, that reaction to impending defeat or dropped points is becoming a trend of Farke’s management.
Leeds, from September onwards, have not found themselves in trouble too often but on days when they do, the coherence of Farke’s general plan slides closer towards a tactic of hit and hope: switch to a back three, pack the pitch with forwards and trust in the weight of pressure to force a breakthrough in the closing minutes.
It failed to work at Sunderland, where Leeds were confronted with the reality of how frustrating this season could prove to be. They had picked up 28 points from the last 33 available before Tuesday — an impressive nine wins from 11. But a 1-0 defeat ensued at the Stadium of Light and, just like that, they were 10 points back from the Championship’s two automatic promotion slots.
Farke after the loss to Sunderland (Mike Egerton/PA Images via Getty Images)
There is not much to criticise about Leeds and yet, a side with what is typically top-two form are a significant distance adrift of those positions. Leicester City and Ipswich Town have so far pulled off the trick of denying Farke the luxury of losing fixtures like Tuesday’s.
Afterwards, Farke denied that the timing of his substitutions had been a factor in the defeat, despite the feeling that Leeds failed to get a comprehensive grip on the contest before he began using his bench in the 75th minute.
Three minutes after his first introductions, Sunderland scored the only goal through Jobe Bellingham. But aside from when precisely Farke introduced his subs, what about the nature of the changes themselves? Is an overload of attacking players from the bench strategic and tactically sound? Or is it born of slight desperation in instances where Leeds are chasing?
In fairness to Farke, the switches he makes in those circumstances are not minus any pattern whatsoever. On four occasions — away at Norwich City, Rotherham United, Stoke City and now Sunderland — he has gone after an equaliser or a winner by doing the same thing: turning a back four into a three with Archie Gray on the right of it, asking Ethan Ampadu to hold the fort alone in midfield and spreading the rest out en masse in front of him.
It worked at Norwich, where Leeds came from two goals down to win 3-2, but it failed to rescue anything from Sunderland and Stoke, or snatch a last-gasp winner in Rotherham — albeit by a fraction after Jaidon Anthony’s strike was disallowed for offside.
When the chips are down, Leeds appear to count on the fact that the opposition will adopt a deep defence, minimising the threat of counter-attacks in return.
The following screengrab from the closing stages against Sunderland is a perfect example of how heavily Farke loads the top end of the pitch when Leeds are under pressure to score.
Ampadu, who has played every minute of this season so far, is left to work in a fair amount of isolation. The back three have a lot of space to protect. But what matters most, and what failed to happen on Tuesday, is that the bodies up front have enough tactical cohesion to yield clear-cut chances.
Aside from a shot from Joel Piroe which was cleared off the line, Sunderland did not look like cracking.
Part of the reason for that was their own response to the arrival of so many forwards from the visiting bench. Sunderland were defensively sound for most of the match and when Farke threw everything at them, they refused to play into Leeds’ hands.
By the 82nd minute, Anthony, Piroe, Crysencio Summerville, Willy Gnonto, Patrick Bamford and Mateo Joseph were on the field together. It was, as shown below, not far off a front line of six. But Sunderland countered Farke’s approach by dropping back with discipline and flooding central areas.
In this scenario, Leeds have a potential overload through Anthony and Summerville on the left-hand side.
But from the position where Bamford picks up the ball, far away on the opposite touchline, it will take an incredibly difficult pass to make anything of that two-v-one.
As it was, Farke’s substitutes — Bamford, Joseph, Anthony or Gnonto — were unable to muster a shot between them. None of the four created any chances either. It was an onslaught without teeth, summing up an outing when Leeds did not properly click. “We didn’t find the cutting edge,” Farke said. “We were not tidy or sharp enough.”
The opposite was true against Norwich in October, where Farke, for the first time, dispensed with all caution and got the reward of a precious win. Leeds are not a negative team in Farke’s 4-2-3-1 setup, but the next image, from that match at Carrow Road, shows them moving to all-out attack with Piroe, Summerville, Gnonto, Bamford, Georginio Rutter and Dan James part of the same XI.
It is entirely possible that the success of the gamble that day convinced Farke to repeat it in other circumstances where Leeds were heading for a poor result.
They were slightly more unfortunate at Rotherham a month later, where their substitutes saw opportunities and delivered a better level of creativity. A challenge by Lee Peltier on James should have yielded a penalty. The offside decision against Anthony, while correct, was extremely marginal.
But the deliberate imbalance created by changes from the bench is apparent again in the following graphic, showing the extent to which Farke committed to a full-on offensive, aware that a draw with relegation candidates Rotherham was not a good outcome.
At Stoke a few days after the Norwich trip, in another 1-0 defeat, the scoreline would have been different had Bamford not missed a penalty. That was where Leeds let the chance of a valuable win slip.
But it is clear to see, below, that with the clock ticking down, Stoke are doing what Rotherham and Sunderland would later do: massing in the middle, pushing Leeds out wide, making them look like they have bodies but few options.
As a rule, Leeds are not a side who trail regularly. Since the win at Ipswich Town in August, they have been behind five times and once at home. But when things go wrong, it is apparent that the solutions Farke envisages are not there to be found in his 4-2-3-1.
He might find that the Hail Mary works for him often enough. Perhaps him pulling that lever is a reflection of how much rests on the central attacking pair of Rutter and Piroe, and the question of what happens in the nine-and-10 zone if that axis is not paying off.
Piroe has started every game since he signed from Swansea City. Rutter has started all but two matches this season. Summerville moved central late on at Sunderland but his strength is running riot from wide areas and he is yet to show he can dictate a contest from in behind a centre-forward.
Farke will look for the resumption of normal service against visitors Coventry City on Saturday, with seven straight wins at Elland Road behind him.
Leeds have been exceptionally consistent at home, rarely required to sound the alarm and dig a result out.
Farke’s pre-match planning has shown itself to be precise, defined and dependable, which is what makes the latter stages of nights like Tuesday so contrary: moments when everyone hopes this is going to work, rather than feeling confident it will.
(Top photo via Getty Images)
